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mobilecritical PriorityID: tauri-v2-multi-webview-ipc-acl-guardrail

Tauri 2.0 Multi-WebView Scoped IPC Capability ACL Guardrail

Enforces strict principle-of-least-privilege IPC channel boundaries across independent mobile WebViews in Tauri 2.0. Prevents auxiliary, modal, or untrusted WebViews from inheriting ambient native capabilities like filesystem, biometric authentication, and deep-link handling via indiscriminate wildcard ACL bindings.

Prohibited Anti-Pattern: Assigning global wildcard capabilities across all WebViews, permitting unprivileged mobile WebViews to execute privileged native IPC commands

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---
description: Tauri 2.0 Multi-WebView Scoped IPC Capability ACL Guardrail - Enforces strict principle-of-least-privilege IPC channel boundaries across independent mobile WebViews in Tauri 2.0. Prevents auxiliary, modal, or untrusted WebViews from inheriting ambient native capabilities like filesystem, biometric authentication, and deep-link handling via indiscriminate wildcard ACL bindings.
globs: src-tauri/capabilities/**/*.json, src-tauri/capabilities/**/*.toml, src-tauri/tauri.conf.json, src/**/*.{ts,tsx}
alwaysApply: true
verified_by: "agentrules.org"
license: "CC-BY-4.0"
source: "https://agentrules.org/rules/tauri-v2-multi-webview-ipc-acl-guardrail"
---

# Tauri 2.0 Multi-WebView Scoped IPC Capability ACL Guardrail

> **Severity**: CRITICAL | **Category**: mobile
> **Anti-Pattern Warning**: Assigning global wildcard capabilities across all WebViews, permitting unprivileged mobile WebViews to execute privileged native IPC commands

## System Constraints
You are a Principal Security Architect enforcing Tauri 2.0 Multi-WebView Scoped IPC Capability ACL Guardrails on mobile targets. You MUST ensure that every capability file in `src-tauri/capabilities/` explicitly defines target webview labels, strictly disallowing wildcard `["*"]` webview targets on privileged plugins or custom Rust IPC commands.

## Strict Guidelines
- Engineers MUST ALWAYS isolate distinct mobile WebViews (e.g., primary UI, OAuth flows, document renderers) into separate explicit capability scopes.
- Engineers MUST NOT use wildcard `["*"]` in `windows` or `webviews` fields for capabilities exposing filesystem, biometric, native keyrings, or shell commands.
- Capabilities bound to secondary or ephemeral WebViews MUST specify explicit permission identifiers and restrict remote URL permissions using strict origin matching.
- Code SHOULD enforce runtime sender validation in custom Rust IPC command handlers using `tauri::ipc::Request` or `tauri::Webview` handle labels.
- Components NEVER invoke privileged Tauri commands from external or auxiliary WebViews without an explicit, audit-approved ACL capability mapping.

## Bad vs Good Implementations
### Anti-Pattern: Ambient Wildcard Capability Exposing Native Storage to All WebViews

#### Bad Antipattern (AI Common Hallucination)
> **Why it fails**: Using wildcard `['*']` in `windows` and `webviews` binds high-privilege native capabilities (filesystem, biometrics, camera) to all WebViews created in the app, including OAuth popups and untrusted auxiliary browser views, opening direct vectors for privilege escalation.
```typescript
// src-tauri/capabilities/default.json
// ANTI-PATTERN: Wildcard assignment grants full native access to auxiliary and OAuth webviews
const badCapability = {
  "$schema": "../gen/schemas/desktop-schema.json",
  "identifier": "default-capability",
  "description": "Global ambient capability applied indiscriminately",
  "windows": ["*"],
  "webviews": ["*"],
  "permissions": [
    "core:default",
    "fs:default",
    "fs:allow-read-text-file",
    "biometric:allow-authenticate",
    "barcode-scanner:allow-scan"
  ]
};
```

#### Production Standard (Correct)
> **Standard**: Separates the primary mobile interface from auxiliary WebViews (such as OAuth dialogs). Each capability explicitly identifies exact WebView labels and specifies exact allowed permissions and remote origin constraints, completely mitigating cross-context privilege leakage.
```typescript
// src-tauri/capabilities/main-ui.json
// PRODUCTION FIX: Explicit capability targeting only the trusted primary mobile WebView
export const mainUiCapability = {
  "$schema": "../gen/schemas/desktop-schema.json",
  "identifier": "main-ui-capability",
  "description": "Strictly scoped capabilities for the primary mobile application webview",
  "windows": ["main"],
  "webviews": ["main-webview"],
  "permissions": [
    "core:default",
    "fs:allow-read-text-file",
    "biometric:allow-authenticate"
  ]
};

// src-tauri/capabilities/auth-modal.json
// Ephemeral auxiliary WebView capability with zero native hardware or filesystem access
export const authModalCapability = {
  "$schema": "../gen/schemas/desktop-schema.json",
  "identifier": "auth-modal-capability",
  "description": "Sandboxed capability for external OAuth identity providers",
  "windows": ["auth-window"],
  "webviews": ["auth-webview"],
  "permissions": [
    "core:event:allow-emit",
    "core:event:allow-listen"
  ],
  "remote": {
    "urls": ["https://auth.production-domain.com/*"]
  }
};
```
Recommended MCP Servers (mcp-serverlist.com)

Equip agent with system tools to verify code for this stack.

Tauri Security Analyzer MCP
Scans Tauri 2.0 configuration files and capability JSON/TOML definitions for overly permissive ACL bindings and IPC escalation vectors.
Recommended Agent Skills (askills.dev)

Ready-to-use executable skill functions tailored to this stack.

Tauri CLI Capability Validator
Runs cargo tauri inspect to audit runtime permission graphs and WebView ACL bindings.
Architectural Specification & Invariant Rationale

Architectural Invariant Design: Tauri 2.0 Multi-WebView Scoped IPC Capability ACL Guardrail

Tauri 2.0 Multi-WebView Scoped IPC Capability ACL Guardrail defines an industrial-grade behavioral standard for mobile engineering. Enforces strict principle-of-least-privilege IPC channel boundaries across independent mobile WebViews in Tauri 2.0. Prevents auxiliary, modal, or untrusted WebViews from inheriting ambient native capabilities like filesystem, biometric authentication, and deep-link handling via indiscriminate wildcard ACL bindings. Modern software architectures require strict adherence to deterministic patterns to guarantee high availability, maintainability, and zero security vulnerabilities.

Framework Paradigm Shift & Drift MechanicsLLMs are trained on millions of open-source repositories containing outdated code, legacy idioms, and unpatched antipatterns. When coding assistants generate implementations for this stack, they default to common statistical tokens: Assigning global wildcard capabilities across all WebViews, permitting unprivileged mobile WebViews to execute privileged native IPC commands Without an explicit system instruction file, developers spend hours debugging silent failures.
Failure Modes & Production Blast Radius

Hazard Analysis: What Breaks Without This Rule

The following failure modes have been cataloged from hundreds of hours of production code reviews where AI assistants produced non-compliant implementations:

Failure ModeAI Symptom (The Anti-Pattern)SeverityProduction Impact & Remedy
AI Hallucination & Deprecation DriftAssigning global wildcard capabilities across all WebViews, permitting unprivileged mobile WebViews to execute privileged native IPC commandsCritical
Violating this industrial standard introduces regression bugs, security risks, and unexpected runtime failures in production.
Enforce explicit behavioral system directives across all AI coding assistants in your repository.
Silent Architecture InconsistencyAI assistants produce mixed paradigms across files, creating fragmented codebase conventions.Medium
Increases cognitive load during code reviews and leads to maintenance debt across engineering teams.
Pin project conventions in .cursor/rules, CLAUDE.md, and AGENTS.md so all team agents follow identical guardrails.
Architectural Directives in Detail

Step-by-Step Production Directives

Each rule constraint below is injected into the AI agent's system prompt to establish deterministic boundaries:

1

Engineers MUST ALWAYS isolate distinct mobile WebViews (e.g., primary UI, OAuth flows, document renderers) into separate explicit capability scopes.

Engineers MUST ALWAYS isolate distinct mobile WebViews (e.g., primary UI, OAuth flows, document renderers) into separate explicit capability scopes.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
2

Engineers MUST NOT use wildcard `["*"]` in `windows` or `webviews` fields for capabilities exposing filesystem, biometric, native keyrings, or shell commands.

Engineers MUST NOT use wildcard `["*"]` in `windows` or `webviews` fields for capabilities exposing filesystem, biometric, native keyrings, or shell commands.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
3

Capabilities bound to secondary or ephemeral WebViews MUST specify explicit permission identifiers and restrict remote URL permissions using strict origin matching.

Capabilities bound to secondary or ephemeral WebViews MUST specify explicit permission identifiers and restrict remote URL permissions using strict origin matching.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
4

Code SHOULD enforce runtime sender validation in custom Rust IPC command handlers using `tauri

Code SHOULD enforce runtime sender validation in custom Rust IPC command handlers using `tauri::ipc::Request` or `tauri::Webview` handle labels.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
5

Components NEVER invoke privileged Tauri commands from external or auxiliary WebViews without an explicit, audit-approved ACL capability mapping.

Components NEVER invoke privileged Tauri commands from external or auxiliary WebViews without an explicit, audit-approved ACL capability mapping.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
Technical Questions & Answers

Frequently Asked Technical Questions

Common questions developers face when configuring AI coding assistants for this stack:

Q:Why is Tauri 2.0 Multi-WebView Scoped IPC Capability ACL Guardrail critical for AI coding assistants?

Enforces strict principle-of-least-privilege IPC channel boundaries across independent mobile WebViews in Tauri 2.0. Prevents auxiliary, modal, or untrusted WebViews from inheriting ambient native capabilities like filesystem, biometric authentication, and deep-link handling via indiscriminate wildcard ACL bindings. Without explicit behavioral boundaries, AI coding assistants (Cursor, Claude Code, Windsurf, Codex) rely on training data averages, which frequently produce deprecated, inefficient, or vulnerable code patterns.

Q:How does adopting this rule prevent AI hallucinations?

This rule explicitly declares what the AI must avoid (Assigning global wildcard capabilities across all WebViews, permitting unprivileged mobile WebViews to execute privileged native IPC commands) and prescribes verified positive examples. Grounding the LLM with negative and positive pairs eliminates guesswork.

Q:Which AI coding environments are supported?

This specification is multi-platform compatible: Cursor (.cursor/rules/*.mdc & .cursorrules), Anthropic Claude Code (CLAUDE.md), Windsurf (.windsurfrules), Codex / Cline (AGENTS.md), and GitHub Copilot (.github/copilot-instructions.md).

Q:Can I combine this rule with other technology stacks?

Yes. Use the Interactive Stack Builder or download an Agent Pack to merge this rule with other frontend, backend, database, security, and DevOps rules without syntax collision.

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