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mobilecritical PriorityID: tauri-v2-ipc-capability-scope-sandboxing

Tauri 2.0 IPC Capability Sandboxing and Origin Verification Standard

Mandates least-privilege IPC capability files, explicit permission scopes, and runtime origin verification across unified desktop and mobile webviews in Tauri 2.0. Prohibits global wildcard plugin permissions and requires strict window-to-capability bindings to eliminate cross-origin privilege escalation.

Prohibited Anti-Pattern: Ambient IPC Exposure via Wildcard Capabilities and Missing Mobile Webview Origin Verification

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---
description: Tauri 2.0 IPC Capability Sandboxing and Origin Verification Standard - Mandates least-privilege IPC capability files, explicit permission scopes, and runtime origin verification across unified desktop and mobile webviews in Tauri 2.0. Prohibits global wildcard plugin permissions and requires strict window-to-capability bindings to eliminate cross-origin privilege escalation.
globs: src-tauri/capabilities/**/*.json, src-tauri/tauri.conf.json, src/**/*.{ts,tsx}
alwaysApply: true
verified_by: "agentrules.org"
license: "CC-BY-4.0"
source: "https://agentrules.org/rules/tauri-v2-ipc-capability-scope-sandboxing"
---

# Tauri 2.0 IPC Capability Sandboxing and Origin Verification Standard

> **Severity**: CRITICAL | **Category**: mobile
> **Anti-Pattern Warning**: Ambient IPC Exposure via Wildcard Capabilities and Missing Mobile Webview Origin Verification

## System Constraints
You are a Principal Security Architect enforcing Tauri 2.0 IPC Capability & Security Scope Sandboxing. Mandate least-privilege IPC command access control lists (ACLs), explicit capability scopes, and runtime URL origin verification across unified desktop and mobile webviews. Prohibit ambient privileges, wildcard capability assignments, and unverified IPC invocations from dynamic or remote origins.

## Strict Guidelines
- Engineers MUST ALWAYS isolate Tauri 2.0 capabilities into dedicated, domain-specific capability files under `src-tauri/capabilities/` targeting specific window labels (e.g., `main`, `mobile-auth`).
- Engineers MUST NOT grant global ambient permissions or assign the wildcard permission `core:default` across unsegmented webview contexts.
- Code SHOULD enforce runtime origin and protocol checks (`tauri://localhost`, `https://tauri.localhost`, or mobile app-scheme) prior to dispatching privileged IPC invokes from TypeScript clients.
- Services MUST restrict filesystem, network, and hardware access using granular scope definitions (e.g., specific subpaths or host patterns) rather than blanket allowlists.
- Components NEVER execute raw `invoke()` calls with dynamic command strings; all invocations must flow through strongly-typed, runtime-validated wrappers that assert current window and origin integrity.

## Bad vs Good Implementations
### Secure Client-Side IPC Dispatcher with Origin Sandboxing

#### Bad Antipattern (AI Common Hallucination)
> **Why it fails**: Invoking raw commands dynamically without origin checks enables cross-context scripting attacks. If a mobile webview navigates to or embeds an external origin, untrusted scripts can invoke arbitrary backend commands with ambient permissions.
```typescript
import { invoke } from '@tauri-apps/api/core';

// ANTI-PATTERN: Raw invoke with ambient trust, no origin validation,
// and exposing dynamic command dispatch to potential embedded iframe or remote URL
export async function executeUserCommand(command: string, payload: unknown) {
  return await invoke(command, { payload });
}

export async function readSensitiveFile(path: string) {
  // Insecure: Relies on broad fs:* capability without client-side boundary checking
  return await invoke('plugin:fs|read_text_file', { path });
}
```

#### Production Standard (Correct)
> **Standard**: Enforces runtime origin boundary assertion against known secure schemes, restricts invocations to an explicit whitelist of allowed commands, and validates that the calling webview matches the authorized capability window label.
```typescript
import { invoke } from '@tauri-apps/api/core';
import { getCurrentWebviewWindow } from '@tauri-apps/api/webviewWindow';

const ALLOWED_ORIGINS = new Set([
  'tauri://localhost',
  'https://tauri.localhost',
  'http://localhost:1420'
]);

const PERMITTED_COMMANDS = ['get_user_profile', 'sync_mobile_state'] as const;
type PermittedCommand = (typeof PERMITTED_COMMANDS)[number];

function assertSecureContext(): void {
  if (typeof window === 'undefined') {
    throw new Error('IPC invocation attempted outside of browser window context.');
  }
  if (!ALLOWED_ORIGINS.has(window.location.origin)) {
    throw new Error(`IPC rejected: Unauthorized origin ${window.location.origin}`);
  }
}

export async function invokeSandboxed<TResponse, TArgs extends Record<string, unknown>>(
  command: PermittedCommand,
  args: TArgs
): Promise<TResponse> {
  assertSecureContext();
  const appWindow = getCurrentWebviewWindow();
  
  if (appWindow.label !== 'main') {
    throw new Error(`IPC rejected: Window '${appWindow.label}' lacks capability for '${command}'`);
  }
  
  return await invoke<TResponse>(command, args);
}
```
Recommended MCP Servers (mcp-serverlist.com)

Equip agent with system tools to verify code for this stack.

Tauri Security Analyzer MCP
Analyzes Tauri 2.0 configuration, capability JSON files, and Rust ACL definitions for security misconfigurations and scope leaks.
Recommended Agent Skills (askills.dev)

Ready-to-use executable skill functions tailored to this stack.

Tauri CLI Capability Auditor
CLI automation skill to audit Tauri 2.0 capabilities, permissions matrix, and mobile attack surfaces.
Architectural Specification & Invariant Rationale

Architectural Invariant Design: Tauri 2.0 IPC Capability Sandboxing and Origin Verification Standard

Tauri 2.0 IPC Capability Sandboxing and Origin Verification Standard defines an industrial-grade behavioral standard for mobile engineering. Mandates least-privilege IPC capability files, explicit permission scopes, and runtime origin verification across unified desktop and mobile webviews in Tauri 2.0. Prohibits global wildcard plugin permissions and requires strict window-to-capability bindings to eliminate cross-origin privilege escalation. Modern software architectures require strict adherence to deterministic patterns to guarantee high availability, maintainability, and zero security vulnerabilities.

Framework Paradigm Shift & Drift MechanicsLLMs are trained on millions of open-source repositories containing outdated code, legacy idioms, and unpatched antipatterns. When coding assistants generate implementations for this stack, they default to common statistical tokens: Ambient IPC Exposure via Wildcard Capabilities and Missing Mobile Webview Origin Verification Without an explicit system instruction file, developers spend hours debugging silent failures.
Failure Modes & Production Blast Radius

Hazard Analysis: What Breaks Without This Rule

The following failure modes have been cataloged from hundreds of hours of production code reviews where AI assistants produced non-compliant implementations:

Failure ModeAI Symptom (The Anti-Pattern)SeverityProduction Impact & Remedy
AI Hallucination & Deprecation DriftAmbient IPC Exposure via Wildcard Capabilities and Missing Mobile Webview Origin VerificationCritical
Violating this industrial standard introduces regression bugs, security risks, and unexpected runtime failures in production.
Enforce explicit behavioral system directives across all AI coding assistants in your repository.
Silent Architecture InconsistencyAI assistants produce mixed paradigms across files, creating fragmented codebase conventions.Medium
Increases cognitive load during code reviews and leads to maintenance debt across engineering teams.
Pin project conventions in .cursor/rules, CLAUDE.md, and AGENTS.md so all team agents follow identical guardrails.
Architectural Directives in Detail

Step-by-Step Production Directives

Each rule constraint below is injected into the AI agent's system prompt to establish deterministic boundaries:

1

Engineers MUST ALWAYS isolate Tauri 2.0 capabilities into dedicated, domain-specific capability files under `src-tauri/capabilities/` targeting specific window labels (e.g., `main`, `mobile-auth`).

Engineers MUST ALWAYS isolate Tauri 2.0 capabilities into dedicated, domain-specific capability files under `src-tauri/capabilities/` targeting specific window labels (e.g., `main`, `mobile-auth`).

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
2

Engineers MUST NOT grant global ambient permissions or assign the wildcard permission `core

Engineers MUST NOT grant global ambient permissions or assign the wildcard permission `core:default` across unsegmented webview contexts.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
3

Code SHOULD enforce runtime origin and protocol checks (`tauri

Code SHOULD enforce runtime origin and protocol checks (`tauri://localhost`, `https://tauri.localhost`, or mobile app-scheme) prior to dispatching privileged IPC invokes from TypeScript clients.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
4

Services MUST restrict filesystem, network, and hardware access using granular scope definitions (e.g., specific subpaths or host patterns) rather than blanket allowlists.

Services MUST restrict filesystem, network, and hardware access using granular scope definitions (e.g., specific subpaths or host patterns) rather than blanket allowlists.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
5

Components NEVER execute raw `invoke()` calls with dynamic command strings

Components NEVER execute raw `invoke()` calls with dynamic command strings; all invocations must flow through strongly-typed, runtime-validated wrappers that assert current window and origin integrity.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
Technical Questions & Answers

Frequently Asked Technical Questions

Common questions developers face when configuring AI coding assistants for this stack:

Q:Why is Tauri 2.0 IPC Capability Sandboxing and Origin Verification Standard critical for AI coding assistants?

Mandates least-privilege IPC capability files, explicit permission scopes, and runtime origin verification across unified desktop and mobile webviews in Tauri 2.0. Prohibits global wildcard plugin permissions and requires strict window-to-capability bindings to eliminate cross-origin privilege escalation. Without explicit behavioral boundaries, AI coding assistants (Cursor, Claude Code, Windsurf, Codex) rely on training data averages, which frequently produce deprecated, inefficient, or vulnerable code patterns.

Q:How does adopting this rule prevent AI hallucinations?

This rule explicitly declares what the AI must avoid (Ambient IPC Exposure via Wildcard Capabilities and Missing Mobile Webview Origin Verification) and prescribes verified positive examples. Grounding the LLM with negative and positive pairs eliminates guesswork.

Q:Which AI coding environments are supported?

This specification is multi-platform compatible: Cursor (.cursor/rules/*.mdc & .cursorrules), Anthropic Claude Code (CLAUDE.md), Windsurf (.windsurfrules), Codex / Cline (AGENTS.md), and GitHub Copilot (.github/copilot-instructions.md).

Q:Can I combine this rule with other technology stacks?

Yes. Use the Interactive Stack Builder or download an Agent Pack to merge this rule with other frontend, backend, database, security, and DevOps rules without syntax collision.

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Citation & Open Source Attribution Guidelines

This specification is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). You are completely free to adapt and share this rule in your workspace. If citing, including in public AI benchmark datasets, or redistributing, attribution to AgentRules.org is required.

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