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mobilecritical PriorityID: tauri-mobile-scoped-plugin-capability-enforcement

Tauri 2.0 Mobile Scoped Plugin Capability & IPC Manifest Isolation

Enforces zero-trust boundary isolation between mobile webview contexts and native platform bridge APIs in Tauri 2.0. Mandates granular, least-privilege capability manifests with strict window scoping and cryptographic validation, eliminating wildcard permissions and unverified IPC invocation surfaces across iOS and Android runtimes.

Prohibited Anti-Pattern: Over-privileged wildcard permissions and unscoped mobile IPC invocation channels exposing native runtime primitives.

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---
description: Tauri 2.0 Mobile Scoped Plugin Capability & IPC Manifest Isolation - Enforces zero-trust boundary isolation between mobile webview contexts and native platform bridge APIs in Tauri 2.0. Mandates granular, least-privilege capability manifests with strict window scoping and cryptographic validation, eliminating wildcard permissions and unverified IPC invocation surfaces across iOS and Android runtimes.
globs: src-tauri/capabilities/**/*.json, src-tauri/tauri.conf.json, src-tauri/src/**/*.rs, src/**/*.{ts,tsx}
alwaysApply: true
verified_by: "agentrules.org"
license: "CC-BY-4.0"
source: "https://agentrules.org/rules/tauri-mobile-scoped-plugin-capability-enforcement"
---

# Tauri 2.0 Mobile Scoped Plugin Capability & IPC Manifest Isolation

> **Severity**: CRITICAL | **Category**: mobile
> **Anti-Pattern Warning**: Over-privileged wildcard permissions and unscoped mobile IPC invocation channels exposing native runtime primitives.

## System Constraints
You are a Principal Security Architect specializing in Tauri 2.0 mobile security. Mandate absolute zero-trust isolation between mobile webviews and native platform APIs. Reject any capability configuration that introduces wildcard permissions, unscoped file system roots, indiscriminate camera/biometrics access, or bridge invocations missing platform restrictions.

## Strict Guidelines
- Engineers MUST ALWAYS define capability manifests in dedicated JSON/TOML files within `src-tauri/capabilities/` specifying explicit target platforms ('android', 'iOS') and concrete window labels.
- Engineers MUST NOT utilize wildcard permissions (e.g., 'fs:default', 'shell:all') or blanket scopes ('**/*') within mobile capabilities.
- Engineers MUST ALWAYS constrain file system, network, and biometric plugins to explicit scopes (e.g., `$APPDATA/*` or `$CACHE/*`) and declare allowed commands specifically.
- Code MUST handle IPC invocation failures as security boundaries by validating capability denial responses (`PermissionDenied`) on the TypeScript client without fallback to unauthenticated paths.
- Components NEVER execute raw platform shell commands or bind unchecked native bridges directly into global window objects.

## Bad vs Good Implementations
### Tauri 2.0 Mobile Capability Scoping (JSON Manifest)

#### Bad Antipattern (AI Common Hallucination)
> **Why it fails**: Binds wildcard window ('*') across all platforms with broad 'fs:default' and 'http:default' permissions without file scoping or domain whitelisting, permitting unrestricted remote reads and arbitrary webview hijackings on mobile.
```json
{
  "$schema": "../gen/schemas/desktop-schema.json",
  "identifier": "mobile-capability",
  "description": "Insecure wildcard capability grant",
  "windows": ["*"],
  "permissions": [
    "core:default",
    "fs:default",
    "http:default"
  ]
}
```

#### Production Standard (Correct)
> **Standard**: Restricts invocation to the 'main' window on iOS/Android, pins network access to authorized API origins, and constrains file reads to the isolated application data directory.
```json
{
  "$schema": "../gen/schemas/desktop-schema.json",
  "identifier": "mobile-scoped-capability",
  "description": "Strictly scoped capability for authenticated mobile surfaces",
  "windows": ["main"],
  "platforms": ["android", "iOS"],
  "permissions": [
    "core:default",
    {
      "identifier": "fs:allow-read-text-file",
      "allow": [{
        "path": "$APPDATA/secure-store/*"
      }]
    },
    {
      "identifier": "http:default",
      "allow": [{
        "url": "https://api.internal.domain/v1/*"
      }]
    }
  ]
}
```

### TypeScript IPC Client Invocation with Boundary Handling

#### Bad Antipattern (AI Common Hallucination)
> **Why it fails**: Attempts to traverse arbitrary platform paths via raw IPC without runtime validation or handling capability denials, causing hard crashes or undefined behavior.
```typescript
import { invoke } from '@tauri-apps/api/core';

// Bad: Assumes unrestricted capability and swallows bridge failures without verification
export async function fetchMobileStorageData(filename: string): Promise<string> {
  return await invoke('plugin:fs|read_text_file', { path: `/data/user/0/${filename}` });
}
```

#### Production Standard (Correct)
> **Standard**: Sanitizes relative path segments, resolves within authorized AppData directories, and treats Tauri capability denials as explicit security boundary violations.
```typescript
import { invoke } from '@tauri-apps/api/core';
import { appDataDir, join } from '@tauri-apps/api/path';

export async function fetchMobileStorageData(fileName: string): Promise<string> {
  // Validate path traversal attempts defensively
  if (fileName.includes('..') || fileName.includes('/') || fileName.includes('\\')) {
    throw new Error('Security Violation: Invalid file key provided.');
  }

  const baseDir = await appDataDir();
  const targetPath = await join(baseDir, 'secure-store', fileName);

  try {
    return await invoke<string>('plugin:fs|read_text_file', {
      path: targetPath
    });
  } catch (error: unknown) {
    const err = error as { code?: string; message?: string };
    if (err?.code === 'PermissionDenied') {
      throw new Error(`Capability verification failed for target: ${targetPath}`);
    }
    throw new Error('Native IPC boundary rejected operation.');
  }
}
```
Recommended MCP Servers (mcp-serverlist.com)

Equip agent with system tools to verify code for this stack.

Tauri Security Analyzer MCP
Analyzes Tauri 2.0 configuration, capability files, and permission manifests for policy compliance and security drift.
Recommended Agent Skills (askills.dev)

Ready-to-use executable skill functions tailored to this stack.

Tauri v2 Mobile Capability Linter
CLI tool to statically validate capability schemas, target platforms, and permission boundaries prior to build orchestration.
Architectural Specification & Invariant Rationale

Architectural Invariant Design: Tauri 2.0 Mobile Scoped Plugin Capability & IPC Manifest Isolation

Tauri 2.0 Mobile Scoped Plugin Capability & IPC Manifest Isolation defines an industrial-grade behavioral standard for mobile engineering. Enforces zero-trust boundary isolation between mobile webview contexts and native platform bridge APIs in Tauri 2.0. Mandates granular, least-privilege capability manifests with strict window scoping and cryptographic validation, eliminating wildcard permissions and unverified IPC invocation surfaces across iOS and Android runtimes. Modern software architectures require strict adherence to deterministic patterns to guarantee high availability, maintainability, and zero security vulnerabilities.

Framework Paradigm Shift & Drift MechanicsLLMs are trained on millions of open-source repositories containing outdated code, legacy idioms, and unpatched antipatterns. When coding assistants generate implementations for this stack, they default to common statistical tokens: Over-privileged wildcard permissions and unscoped mobile IPC invocation channels exposing native runtime primitives. Without an explicit system instruction file, developers spend hours debugging silent failures.
Failure Modes & Production Blast Radius

Hazard Analysis: What Breaks Without This Rule

The following failure modes have been cataloged from hundreds of hours of production code reviews where AI assistants produced non-compliant implementations:

Failure ModeAI Symptom (The Anti-Pattern)SeverityProduction Impact & Remedy
AI Hallucination & Deprecation DriftOver-privileged wildcard permissions and unscoped mobile IPC invocation channels exposing native runtime primitives.Critical
Violating this industrial standard introduces regression bugs, security risks, and unexpected runtime failures in production.
Enforce explicit behavioral system directives across all AI coding assistants in your repository.
Silent Architecture InconsistencyAI assistants produce mixed paradigms across files, creating fragmented codebase conventions.Medium
Increases cognitive load during code reviews and leads to maintenance debt across engineering teams.
Pin project conventions in .cursor/rules, CLAUDE.md, and AGENTS.md so all team agents follow identical guardrails.
Architectural Directives in Detail

Step-by-Step Production Directives

Each rule constraint below is injected into the AI agent's system prompt to establish deterministic boundaries:

1

Engineers MUST ALWAYS define capability manifests in dedicated JSON/TOML files within `src-tauri/capabilities/` specifying explicit target platforms ('android', 'iOS') and concrete window labels.

Engineers MUST ALWAYS define capability manifests in dedicated JSON/TOML files within `src-tauri/capabilities/` specifying explicit target platforms ('android', 'iOS') and concrete window labels.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
2

Engineers MUST NOT utilize wildcard permissions (e.g., 'fs

Engineers MUST NOT utilize wildcard permissions (e.g., 'fs:default', 'shell:all') or blanket scopes ('**/*') within mobile capabilities.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
3

Engineers MUST ALWAYS constrain file system, network, and biometric plugins to explicit scopes (e.g., `$APPDATA/*` or `$CACHE/*`) and declare allowed commands specifically.

Engineers MUST ALWAYS constrain file system, network, and biometric plugins to explicit scopes (e.g., `$APPDATA/*` or `$CACHE/*`) and declare allowed commands specifically.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
4

Code MUST handle IPC invocation failures as security boundaries by validating capability denial responses (`PermissionDenied`) on the TypeScript client without fallback to unauthenticated paths.

Code MUST handle IPC invocation failures as security boundaries by validating capability denial responses (`PermissionDenied`) on the TypeScript client without fallback to unauthenticated paths.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
5

Components NEVER execute raw platform shell commands or bind unchecked native bridges directly into global window objects.

Components NEVER execute raw platform shell commands or bind unchecked native bridges directly into global window objects.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
Technical Questions & Answers

Frequently Asked Technical Questions

Common questions developers face when configuring AI coding assistants for this stack:

Q:Why is Tauri 2.0 Mobile Scoped Plugin Capability & IPC Manifest Isolation critical for AI coding assistants?

Enforces zero-trust boundary isolation between mobile webview contexts and native platform bridge APIs in Tauri 2.0. Mandates granular, least-privilege capability manifests with strict window scoping and cryptographic validation, eliminating wildcard permissions and unverified IPC invocation surfaces across iOS and Android runtimes. Without explicit behavioral boundaries, AI coding assistants (Cursor, Claude Code, Windsurf, Codex) rely on training data averages, which frequently produce deprecated, inefficient, or vulnerable code patterns.

Q:How does adopting this rule prevent AI hallucinations?

This rule explicitly declares what the AI must avoid (Over-privileged wildcard permissions and unscoped mobile IPC invocation channels exposing native runtime primitives.) and prescribes verified positive examples. Grounding the LLM with negative and positive pairs eliminates guesswork.

Q:Which AI coding environments are supported?

This specification is multi-platform compatible: Cursor (.cursor/rules/*.mdc & .cursorrules), Anthropic Claude Code (CLAUDE.md), Windsurf (.windsurfrules), Codex / Cline (AGENTS.md), and GitHub Copilot (.github/copilot-instructions.md).

Q:Can I combine this rule with other technology stacks?

Yes. Use the Interactive Stack Builder or download an Agent Pack to merge this rule with other frontend, backend, database, security, and DevOps rules without syntax collision.

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