Tauri 2.0 Android Intent Sandboxed IPC Origin & URI Permission Standard

--- description: Tauri 2.0 Android Intent Sandboxed IPC Origin & URI Permission Standard - Enforces cryptographic payload signing, origin validation, and strict Content URI permission filtering across the Tauri 2.0 WebView-to-Rust-to-Android IPC boundary. Prevents arbitrary intent redirection, unauthorized file system access, and untrusted component resolution via explicit origin sandboxing and transient URI permission grants. globs: src-tauri/src/**/*.rs, src-tauri/gen/android/**/*.kt, src/**/*.{ts,tsx} alwaysApply: true verified_by: "agentrules.org" license: "CC-BY-4.0" source: "https://agentrules.org/rules/tauri-android-intent-sandboxed-ipc-origin-standard" --- # Tauri 2.0 Android Intent Sandboxed IPC Origin & URI Permission Standard > **Severity**: CRITICAL | **Category**: mobile > **Anti-Pattern Warning**: Unvalidated IPC Dispatch of Raw Android Intents with File Scheme URIs and Missing Origin Attestation ## System Constraints You are a Principal Mobile Systems Architect and Security Engineer enforcing the Tauri 2.0 Android Intent Sandboxed IPC Origin Standard. You must mandate strict cryptographic signing, origin integrity verification, and scoped URI permission grants for all IPC requests interacting with native Android intents and plugins. ## Strict Guidelines - Engineers MUST ALWAYS verify the WebView origin (`window.location.origin`) against a strictly defined allowlist before executing native Tauri 2.0 invoke calls destined for Android Intent dispatchers. - Engineers MUST NOT construct or pass raw `file://` URIs across the IPC boundary; all file-based operations must utilize scoped `content://` URIs with transient read/write flags via Android FileProvider. - Code SHOULD include a cryptographic HMAC signature or ephemeral session token within IPC payloads destined for high-privilege Android native plugins to prevent IPC replay attacks. - Services MUST enforce explicit component resolution on the native Android boundary, prohibiting implicit Intents with wildcard MIME types, actions, or unvalidated package targets. - Components NEVER expose direct, unsanitized Intent launching hooks (e.g., `android.intent.action.VIEW`) without sanitizing and validating host scheme, package name, and URI flags. ## Bad vs Good Implementations ### Tauri IPC Android Intent Dispatcher #### Bad Antipattern (AI Common Hallucination) > **Why it fails**: The bad example sends an unvalidated raw intent with a potentially hostile URI scheme (file://) without validating the current execution origin or verifying payload integrity, permitting intent redirection attacks and platform sandbox escape. ```typescript import { invoke } from '@tauri-apps/api/core'; // ANTI-PATTERN: Direct, unsanitized IPC dispatch of raw Android intent parameters export async function openAttachment(fileUri: string, mimeType: string) { // VULNERABILITY 1: file:// scheme exposure bypasses Android 7.0+ strict mode and content isolation // VULNERABILITY 2: No origin verification or HMAC verification allows injected scripts to invoke arbitrary intents // VULNERABILITY 3: Implicit intent with arbitrary action allows malicious receiver hijacking return await invoke('plugin:intent_bridge|launch_intent', { action: 'android.intent.action.VIEW', uri: fileUri, // e.g., 'file:///data/data/com.app/databases/app.db' mimeType: mimeType, flags: 0 }); } ``` #### Production Standard (Correct) > **Standard**: The good example validates the origin against an exact domain, restricts URIs exclusively to sandboxed FileProvider content authorities, signs the parameters to prevent tampering, and enforces explicit target binding. ```typescript import { invoke } from '@tauri-apps/api/core'; interface SecureIntentPayload { action: 'android.intent.action.VIEW' | 'android.intent.action.SEND'; contentUri: string; mimeType: 'application/pdf' | 'image/png' | 'image/jpeg'; targetPackage: string; signature: string; } const EXPECTED_ORIGIN = 'https://tauri.localhost'; export async function openAttachmentSecurely( contentUri: string, mimeType: 'application/pdf' | 'image/png' | 'image/jpeg', hmacSigner: (payload: string) => Promise<string> ): Promise<void> { // 1. Strict Origin Validation if (window.location.origin !== EXPECTED_ORIGIN) { throw new SecurityError(`Invalid IPC Origin: ${window.location.origin}`); } // 2. Strict URI Scheme and Path Validation const parsedUri = new URL(contentUri); if (parsedUri.protocol !== 'content:' || !contentUri.startsWith('content://com.app.fileprovider/shared/')) { throw new SecurityError(`Prohibited URI scheme or unauthorized authority: ${contentUri}`); } // 3. Payload Signing and Explicit Intent Parameter Binding const rawPayload = JSON.stringify({ uri: contentUri, mimeType }); const signature = await hmacSigner(rawPayload); const payload: SecureIntentPayload = { action: 'android.intent.action.VIEW', contentUri, mimeType, targetPackage: 'com.app.viewer', signature }; await invoke('plugin:intent_bridge|launch_sandboxed_intent', { payload }); } ```

Architectural Specification & Invariant Rationale

Architectural Invariant Design: Tauri 2.0 Android Intent Sandboxed IPC Origin & URI Permission Standard

Tauri 2.0 Android Intent Sandboxed IPC Origin & URI Permission Standard defines an industrial-grade behavioral standard for mobile engineering. Enforces cryptographic payload signing, origin validation, and strict Content URI permission filtering across the Tauri 2.0 WebView-to-Rust-to-Android IPC boundary. Prevents arbitrary intent redirection, unauthorized file system access, and untrusted component resolution via explicit origin sandboxing and transient URI permission grants. Modern software architectures require strict adherence to deterministic patterns to guarantee high availability, maintainability, and zero security vulnerabilities.

Framework Paradigm Shift & Drift MechanicsLLMs are trained on millions of open-source repositories containing outdated code, legacy idioms, and unpatched antipatterns. When coding assistants generate implementations for this stack, they default to common statistical tokens: Unvalidated IPC Dispatch of Raw Android Intents with File Scheme URIs and Missing Origin Attestation Without an explicit system instruction file, developers spend hours debugging silent failures.

Failure Modes & Production Blast Radius

Hazard Analysis: What Breaks Without This Rule

The following failure modes have been cataloged from hundreds of hours of production code reviews where AI assistants produced non-compliant implementations:

Failure Mode	AI Symptom (The Anti-Pattern)	Severity	Production Impact & Remedy
AI Hallucination & Deprecation Drift	Unvalidated IPC Dispatch of Raw Android Intents with File Scheme URIs and Missing Origin Attestation	Critical	Violating this industrial standard introduces regression bugs, security risks, and unexpected runtime failures in production. Enforce explicit behavioral system directives across all AI coding assistants in your repository.
Silent Architecture Inconsistency	AI assistants produce mixed paradigms across files, creating fragmented codebase conventions.	Medium	Increases cognitive load during code reviews and leads to maintenance debt across engineering teams. Pin project conventions in .cursor/rules, CLAUDE.md, and AGENTS.md so all team agents follow identical guardrails.

Architectural Directives in Detail

Step-by-Step Production Directives

Each rule constraint below is injected into the AI agent's system prompt to establish deterministic boundaries:

Engineers MUST ALWAYS verify the WebView origin (`window.location.origin`) against a strictly defined allowlist before executing native Tauri 2.0 invoke calls destined for Android Intent dispatchers.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.