This specification is maintained by the AgentRules Working Group. Have enhancements or want to claim maintainership?Submit Specification →
devopscritical PriorityID: ebpf-tetragon-lsm-privilege-escalation-guardrail

Synchronous eBPF Tetragon LSM Hooks for Privilege Escalation and Container Escape Prevention

Enforces synchronous kernel-space execution boundaries using Tetragon TracingPolicies hooked into Linux Security Modules (LSM) rather than asynchronous kprobes. Guarantees immediate process termination (SIGKILL) within the kernel execution context upon unauthorized credential modification (commit_creds, setns) or container namespace traversal before userspace telemetry triggers.

Prohibited Anti-Pattern: Asynchronous Userspace-Dependent Detection of Kernel Privilege Escalation via Non-Blocking Kprobes

Export Ready-to-Drop Configuration

Select format below to copy code or download file directly.

---
description: Synchronous eBPF Tetragon LSM Hooks for Privilege Escalation and Container Escape Prevention - Enforces synchronous kernel-space execution boundaries using Tetragon TracingPolicies hooked into Linux Security Modules (LSM) rather than asynchronous kprobes. Guarantees immediate process termination (SIGKILL) within the kernel execution context upon unauthorized credential modification (commit_creds, setns) or container namespace traversal before userspace telemetry triggers.
globs: deploy/tetragon/**/*.yaml, k8s/**/*.yaml, security/policies/**/*.yaml
alwaysApply: true
verified_by: "agentrules.org"
license: "CC-BY-4.0"
source: "https://agentrules.org/rules/ebpf-tetragon-lsm-privilege-escalation-guardrail"
---

# Synchronous eBPF Tetragon LSM Hooks for Privilege Escalation and Container Escape Prevention

> **Severity**: CRITICAL | **Category**: devops
> **Anti-Pattern Warning**: Asynchronous Userspace-Dependent Detection of Kernel Privilege Escalation via Non-Blocking Kprobes

## System Constraints
You are a Principal Systems and Kernel Security Architect enforcing synchronous in-kernel runtime security invariants via Cilium Tetragon. You ensure all security policies governing privilege transitions and namespace changes are attached strictly to Linux Security Module (LSM) hooks (or synchronous return kprobes with in-kernel SIGKILL overrides) rather than standard tracepoints, preventing Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race conditions during container escapes.

## Strict Guidelines
- Engineers MUST ALWAYS attach Tetragon TracingPolicies to BPF LSM hooks (e.g., security_bprm_check, security_capable, security_file_open) when enforcing synchronous blocking or process termination actions.
- Engineers MUST NOT rely on asynchronous auditd or userspace Tetragon event logging without synchronous in-kernel Sigkill/Override actions for high-severity namespace escalations.
- TracingPolicies targeting container isolation MUST explicitly match against namespace metadata or pod label selectors to avoid impacting host-level control plane daemons.
- TracingPolicies enforcing binary execution boundaries MUST assert 'matchActions' with action 'Sigkill' to terminate the offending thread synchronously in the kernel before syscall execution completes.
- Engineers MUST ensure BPF LSM is enabled in the host kernel configuration (CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y, lsm=lockdown,yama,bpf) before deploying synchronous enforcement policies.

## Bad vs Good Implementations
### Synchronous LSM In-Kernel Termination vs. Asynchronous Kprobe Audit

#### Bad Antipattern (AI Common Hallucination)
> **Why it fails**: Kprobes without synchronous overrides execute after or during kernel credential manipulation without halting the syscall execution path. Attackers can execute payload instructions (e.g., overwriting memfd or namespace fd) before Tetragon's userspace daemon receives the ring-buffer event and issues an external kill command.
```yaml
# INSUFFICIENT: Asynchronous kprobe with userspace post-facto logging
# Allows race condition: exploit runs and terminates before agent processes audit event
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
  name: audit-privilege-escalation
spec:
  kprobes:
    - call: "commit_creds"
      syscall: false
      args:
        - index: 0
          type: "cred"
      # Missing in-kernel enforcement: userspace notification only
```

#### Production Standard (Correct)
> **Standard**: Attaches directly to security_capable LSM hook and sys_setns boundary with an explicit 'Sigkill' action. The BPF program evaluates the capability check synchronously inside kernel space, terminating the process immediately prior to credential evaluation or namespace attachment.
```yaml
# COMPLIANT: Synchronous LSM enforcement with in-kernel SIGKILL
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
  name: block-namespace-privilege-escalation
spec:
  kprobes:
    - call: "sys_setns"
      syscall: true
      args:
        - index: 0
          type: "int"
        - index: 1
          type: "int"
      selectors:
        - matchNamespaces:
            - namespace: default
          matchActions:
            - action: Sigkill
  lsmHooks:
    - hook: "security_capable"
      args:
        - index: 1
          type: "int"
          returnCopy: false
      selectors:
        - matchArgs:
            - index: 1
              operator: "Equal"
              values:
                - "21" # CAP_SYS_ADMIN
          matchActions:
            - action: Sigkill
```

Architectural Specification & Invariant Rationale

Architectural Invariant Design: Synchronous eBPF Tetragon LSM Hooks for Privilege Escalation and Container Escape Prevention

Synchronous eBPF Tetragon LSM Hooks for Privilege Escalation and Container Escape Prevention defines an industrial-grade behavioral standard for devops engineering. Enforces synchronous kernel-space execution boundaries using Tetragon TracingPolicies hooked into Linux Security Modules (LSM) rather than asynchronous kprobes. Guarantees immediate process termination (SIGKILL) within the kernel execution context upon unauthorized credential modification (commit_creds, setns) or container namespace traversal before userspace telemetry triggers. Modern software architectures require strict adherence to deterministic patterns to guarantee high availability, maintainability, and zero security vulnerabilities.

Framework Paradigm Shift & Drift MechanicsLLMs are trained on millions of open-source repositories containing outdated code, legacy idioms, and unpatched antipatterns. When coding assistants generate implementations for this stack, they default to common statistical tokens: Asynchronous Userspace-Dependent Detection of Kernel Privilege Escalation via Non-Blocking Kprobes Without an explicit system instruction file, developers spend hours debugging silent failures.
Failure Modes & Production Blast Radius

Hazard Analysis: What Breaks Without This Rule

The following failure modes have been cataloged from hundreds of hours of production code reviews where AI assistants produced non-compliant implementations:

Failure ModeAI Symptom (The Anti-Pattern)SeverityProduction Impact & Remedy
AI Hallucination & Deprecation DriftAsynchronous Userspace-Dependent Detection of Kernel Privilege Escalation via Non-Blocking KprobesCritical
Violating this industrial standard introduces regression bugs, security risks, and unexpected runtime failures in production.
Enforce explicit behavioral system directives across all AI coding assistants in your repository.
Silent Architecture InconsistencyAI assistants produce mixed paradigms across files, creating fragmented codebase conventions.Medium
Increases cognitive load during code reviews and leads to maintenance debt across engineering teams.
Pin project conventions in .cursor/rules, CLAUDE.md, and AGENTS.md so all team agents follow identical guardrails.
Architectural Directives in Detail

Step-by-Step Production Directives

Each rule constraint below is injected into the AI agent's system prompt to establish deterministic boundaries:

1

Engineers MUST ALWAYS attach Tetragon TracingPolicies to BPF LSM hooks (e.g., security_bprm_check, security_capable, security_file_open) when enforcing synchronous blocking or process termination actions.

Engineers MUST ALWAYS attach Tetragon TracingPolicies to BPF LSM hooks (e.g., security_bprm_check, security_capable, security_file_open) when enforcing synchronous blocking or process termination actions.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
2

Engineers MUST NOT rely on asynchronous auditd or userspace Tetragon event logging without synchronous in-kernel Sigkill/Override actions for high-severity namespace escalations.

Engineers MUST NOT rely on asynchronous auditd or userspace Tetragon event logging without synchronous in-kernel Sigkill/Override actions for high-severity namespace escalations.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
3

TracingPolicies targeting container isolation MUST explicitly match against namespace metadata or pod label selectors to avoid impacting host-level control plane daemons.

TracingPolicies targeting container isolation MUST explicitly match against namespace metadata or pod label selectors to avoid impacting host-level control plane daemons.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
4

TracingPolicies enforcing binary execution boundaries MUST assert 'matchActions' with action 'Sigkill' to terminate the offending thread synchronously in the kernel before syscall execution completes.

TracingPolicies enforcing binary execution boundaries MUST assert 'matchActions' with action 'Sigkill' to terminate the offending thread synchronously in the kernel before syscall execution completes.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
5

Engineers MUST ensure BPF LSM is enabled in the host kernel configuration (CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y, lsm=lockdown,yama,bpf) before deploying synchronous enforcement policies.

Engineers MUST ensure BPF LSM is enabled in the host kernel configuration (CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y, lsm=lockdown,yama,bpf) before deploying synchronous enforcement policies.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
Technical Questions & Answers

Frequently Asked Technical Questions

Common questions developers face when configuring AI coding assistants for this stack:

Q:Why is Synchronous eBPF Tetragon LSM Hooks for Privilege Escalation and Container Escape Prevention critical for AI coding assistants?

Enforces synchronous kernel-space execution boundaries using Tetragon TracingPolicies hooked into Linux Security Modules (LSM) rather than asynchronous kprobes. Guarantees immediate process termination (SIGKILL) within the kernel execution context upon unauthorized credential modification (commit_creds, setns) or container namespace traversal before userspace telemetry triggers. Without explicit behavioral boundaries, AI coding assistants (Cursor, Claude Code, Windsurf, Codex) rely on training data averages, which frequently produce deprecated, inefficient, or vulnerable code patterns.

Q:How does adopting this rule prevent AI hallucinations?

This rule explicitly declares what the AI must avoid (Asynchronous Userspace-Dependent Detection of Kernel Privilege Escalation via Non-Blocking Kprobes) and prescribes verified positive examples. Grounding the LLM with negative and positive pairs eliminates guesswork.

Q:Which AI coding environments are supported?

This specification is multi-platform compatible: Cursor (.cursor/rules/*.mdc & .cursorrules), Anthropic Claude Code (CLAUDE.md), Windsurf (.windsurfrules), Codex / Cline (AGENTS.md), and GitHub Copilot (.github/copilot-instructions.md).

Q:Can I combine this rule with other technology stacks?

Yes. Use the Interactive Stack Builder or download an Agent Pack to merge this rule with other frontend, backend, database, security, and DevOps rules without syntax collision.

Open Specification · CC BY 4.0·Free for Personal, Team & Commercial In-Repo Use

Citation & Open Source Attribution Guidelines

This specification is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). You are completely free to adapt and share this rule in your workspace. If citing, including in public AI benchmark datasets, or redistributing, attribution to AgentRules.org is required.

1 Rule in Stack

Synchronous