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securitycritical PriorityID: ebpf-tetragon-lsm-capability-escape-enforcement

eBPF Tetragon Dynamic LSM Capability Escape Enforcement & Synchronous Termination

Enforces synchronous in-kernel detection and immediate process termination via eBPF Tetragon TracingPolicies hooked into raw Linux Security Module (LSM) boundaries. Prevents container escape vectors and privilege escalations by blocking unprivileged-to-privileged namespace transitions before kernel capability handoff executes.

Prohibited Anti-Pattern: Asynchronous Userspace Alerting or Syscall-Only Tracepoints for Privilege Escalation

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---
description: eBPF Tetragon Dynamic LSM Capability Escape Enforcement & Synchronous Termination - Enforces synchronous in-kernel detection and immediate process termination via eBPF Tetragon TracingPolicies hooked into raw Linux Security Module (LSM) boundaries. Prevents container escape vectors and privilege escalations by blocking unprivileged-to-privileged namespace transitions before kernel capability handoff executes.
globs: deploy/**/*.yaml, k8s/**/*.yaml, policies/**/*.yaml, crds/**/*.yaml
alwaysApply: true
verified_by: "agentrules.org"
license: "CC-BY-4.0"
source: "https://agentrules.org/rules/ebpf-tetragon-lsm-capability-escape-enforcement"
---

# eBPF Tetragon Dynamic LSM Capability Escape Enforcement & Synchronous Termination

> **Severity**: CRITICAL | **Category**: security
> **Anti-Pattern Warning**: Asynchronous Userspace Alerting or Syscall-Only Tracepoints for Privilege Escalation

## System Constraints
You are a Principal Security Architect specializing in Linux kernel eBPF security, Tetragon, and container isolation. Mandate zero-trust, in-kernel synchronous termination (Sigkill) on unauthorized capability transitions at LSM hook boundaries.

## Strict Guidelines
- Engineers MUST ALWAYS attach capability enforcement policies directly to raw LSM hooks (e.g., security_capable) or critical kernel cred transition points (commit_creds) rather than non-blocking raw syscall enter tracepoints.
- Engineers MUST configure synchronous in-kernel Sigkill actions (action: Sigkill) within Tetragon TracingPolicies to terminate offending threads before returning control to userspace.
- Engineers MUST NOT rely on userspace audit loops, daemon alerting pipelines, or post-execution logging (action: Post) to mitigate container breakout vectors.
- Code SHOULD filter selectors explicitly by capability integer IDs (e.g., CAP_SYS_ADMIN=21, CAP_SYS_PTRACE=19, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE=1) and ensure namespace checks differentiate host init_user_ns from containerized user_ns.
- Services MUST ensure Tetragon is deployed with BPF LSM support enabled in the host kernel (CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y) and tetragon.enforceKprobeArgs set to true.

## Bad vs Good Implementations
### Tetragon Capability Escalation Enforcement Policy

#### Bad Antipattern (AI Common Hallucination)
> **Why it fails**: This policy only triggers on syscall entry (sys_enter_setns) and uses 'action: Post'. Post merely logs the event asynchronously to userspace. By the time a userspace agent processes the notification, an exploit payload has already executed with escalated privileges.
```yaml
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
  name: audit-setns-escape
spec:
  kprobes:
    - call: "sys_enter_setns"
      syscall: true
      args:
        - index: 0
          type: "int"
        - index: 1
          type: "int"
      # Flaw: Syscall enter without LSM enforcement permits TOCTOU.
      # Flaw: Missing in-kernel kill action; allows container payload to execute.
      selectors:
        - matchArgs:
            - index: 1
              operator: "Equal"
              values:
                - "0"
          matchActions:
            - action: Post
```

#### Production Standard (Correct)
> **Standard**: Attaches directly to the kernel LSM hook 'security_capable' and evaluates the capability argument before the kernel validates the credential. On detecting CAP_SYS_ADMIN requests inside container boundaries, Tetragon synchronously sends a SIGKILL directly from eBPF.
```yaml
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
  name: block-namespace-cap-escape
spec:
  lsm:
    - hook: "security_capable"
      args:
        - index: 0
          type: "cred"
        - index: 1
          type: "user_namespace"
        - index: 2
          type: "int"
        - index: 3
          type: "uint"
      selectors:
        - matchArgs:
            # Index 2 is the capability number: 21 is CAP_SYS_ADMIN
            - index: 2
              operator: "Equal"
              values:
                - "21"
          matchNamespaces:
            - namespace: default
              operator: "In"
          matchActions:
            # Synchronous in-kernel SIGKILL before capability check completes
            - action: Sigkill
```
Recommended MCP Servers (mcp-serverlist.com)

Equip agent with system tools to verify code for this stack.

Kubernetes Cluster Inspector
Inspects cluster TracingPolicy CRDs and verifies active Tetragon DaemonSet deployments.
Recommended Agent Skills (askills.dev)

Ready-to-use executable skill functions tailored to this stack.

Tetragon CLI (tetra)
CLI utility to observe real-time Tetragon eBPF sensor events and validate LSM hook attachments.
Architectural Specification & Invariant Rationale

Architectural Invariant Design: eBPF Tetragon Dynamic LSM Capability Escape Enforcement & Synchronous Termination

eBPF Tetragon Dynamic LSM Capability Escape Enforcement & Synchronous Termination defines an industrial-grade behavioral standard for security engineering. Enforces synchronous in-kernel detection and immediate process termination via eBPF Tetragon TracingPolicies hooked into raw Linux Security Module (LSM) boundaries. Prevents container escape vectors and privilege escalations by blocking unprivileged-to-privileged namespace transitions before kernel capability handoff executes. Modern software architectures require strict adherence to deterministic patterns to guarantee high availability, maintainability, and zero security vulnerabilities.

Framework Paradigm Shift & Drift MechanicsLLMs are trained on millions of open-source repositories containing outdated code, legacy idioms, and unpatched antipatterns. When coding assistants generate implementations for this stack, they default to common statistical tokens: Asynchronous Userspace Alerting or Syscall-Only Tracepoints for Privilege Escalation Without an explicit system instruction file, developers spend hours debugging silent failures.
Failure Modes & Production Blast Radius

Hazard Analysis: What Breaks Without This Rule

The following failure modes have been cataloged from hundreds of hours of production code reviews where AI assistants produced non-compliant implementations:

Failure ModeAI Symptom (The Anti-Pattern)SeverityProduction Impact & Remedy
AI Hallucination & Deprecation DriftAsynchronous Userspace Alerting or Syscall-Only Tracepoints for Privilege EscalationCritical
Violating this industrial standard introduces regression bugs, security risks, and unexpected runtime failures in production.
Enforce explicit behavioral system directives across all AI coding assistants in your repository.
Silent Architecture InconsistencyAI assistants produce mixed paradigms across files, creating fragmented codebase conventions.Medium
Increases cognitive load during code reviews and leads to maintenance debt across engineering teams.
Pin project conventions in .cursor/rules, CLAUDE.md, and AGENTS.md so all team agents follow identical guardrails.
Architectural Directives in Detail

Step-by-Step Production Directives

Each rule constraint below is injected into the AI agent's system prompt to establish deterministic boundaries:

1

Engineers MUST ALWAYS attach capability enforcement policies directly to raw LSM hooks (e.g., security_capable) or critical kernel cred transition points (commit_creds) rather than non-blocking raw syscall enter tracepoints.

Engineers MUST ALWAYS attach capability enforcement policies directly to raw LSM hooks (e.g., security_capable) or critical kernel cred transition points (commit_creds) rather than non-blocking raw syscall enter tracepoints.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
2

Engineers MUST configure synchronous in-kernel Sigkill actions (action

Engineers MUST configure synchronous in-kernel Sigkill actions (action: Sigkill) within Tetragon TracingPolicies to terminate offending threads before returning control to userspace.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
3

Engineers MUST NOT rely on userspace audit loops, daemon alerting pipelines, or post-execution logging (action

Engineers MUST NOT rely on userspace audit loops, daemon alerting pipelines, or post-execution logging (action: Post) to mitigate container breakout vectors.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
4

Code SHOULD filter selectors explicitly by capability integer IDs (e.g., CAP_SYS_ADMIN=21, CAP_SYS_PTRACE=19, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE=1) and ensure namespace checks differentiate host init_user_ns from containerized user_ns.

Code SHOULD filter selectors explicitly by capability integer IDs (e.g., CAP_SYS_ADMIN=21, CAP_SYS_PTRACE=19, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE=1) and ensure namespace checks differentiate host init_user_ns from containerized user_ns.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
5

Services MUST ensure Tetragon is deployed with BPF LSM support enabled in the host kernel (CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y) and tetragon.enforceKprobeArgs set to true.

Services MUST ensure Tetragon is deployed with BPF LSM support enabled in the host kernel (CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y) and tetragon.enforceKprobeArgs set to true.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
Technical Questions & Answers

Frequently Asked Technical Questions

Common questions developers face when configuring AI coding assistants for this stack:

Q:Why is eBPF Tetragon Dynamic LSM Capability Escape Enforcement & Synchronous Termination critical for AI coding assistants?

Enforces synchronous in-kernel detection and immediate process termination via eBPF Tetragon TracingPolicies hooked into raw Linux Security Module (LSM) boundaries. Prevents container escape vectors and privilege escalations by blocking unprivileged-to-privileged namespace transitions before kernel capability handoff executes. Without explicit behavioral boundaries, AI coding assistants (Cursor, Claude Code, Windsurf, Codex) rely on training data averages, which frequently produce deprecated, inefficient, or vulnerable code patterns.

Q:How does adopting this rule prevent AI hallucinations?

This rule explicitly declares what the AI must avoid (Asynchronous Userspace Alerting or Syscall-Only Tracepoints for Privilege Escalation) and prescribes verified positive examples. Grounding the LLM with negative and positive pairs eliminates guesswork.

Q:Which AI coding environments are supported?

This specification is multi-platform compatible: Cursor (.cursor/rules/*.mdc & .cursorrules), Anthropic Claude Code (CLAUDE.md), Windsurf (.windsurfrules), Codex / Cline (AGENTS.md), and GitHub Copilot (.github/copilot-instructions.md).

Q:Can I combine this rule with other technology stacks?

Yes. Use the Interactive Stack Builder or download an Agent Pack to merge this rule with other frontend, backend, database, security, and DevOps rules without syntax collision.

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