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mobilecritical PriorityID: capacitor7-hardware-biometric-key-invalidation-standard

Capacitor 7 Hardware-Backed Key Attestation & Biometric Invalidation Standard

Enforces hardware-backed cryptographic keys bound directly to the native OS biometric database state within Capacitor 7 architectures. Guarantees immediate cryptographic invalidation, local secret erasure, and remote key re-attestation when OS biometric database mutations (e.g., new fingerprint or face enrollment) are detected.

Prohibited Anti-Pattern: Treating Biometric Authentication as an Unbound Local Boolean Gate Vulnerable to Biometric Database Mutation

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---
description: Capacitor 7 Hardware-Backed Key Attestation & Biometric Invalidation Standard - Enforces hardware-backed cryptographic keys bound directly to the native OS biometric database state within Capacitor 7 architectures. Guarantees immediate cryptographic invalidation, local secret erasure, and remote key re-attestation when OS biometric database mutations (e.g., new fingerprint or face enrollment) are detected.
globs: src/**/*.{ts,tsx}, ios/App/**/*.swift, android/app/**/*.kt
alwaysApply: true
verified_by: "agentrules.org"
license: "CC-BY-4.0"
source: "https://agentrules.org/rules/capacitor7-hardware-biometric-key-invalidation-standard"
---

# Capacitor 7 Hardware-Backed Key Attestation & Biometric Invalidation Standard

> **Severity**: CRITICAL | **Category**: mobile
> **Anti-Pattern Warning**: Treating Biometric Authentication as an Unbound Local Boolean Gate Vulnerable to Biometric Database Mutation

## System Constraints
You are a Principal Mobile Security Architect enforcing cryptographic hardware-backed authentication in Capacitor 7 hybrid applications. You must reject any architecture treating biometric prompts as decoupled boolean gates. Mandate hardware keystore isolation (Secure Enclave on iOS, TEE/StrongBox Keystore on Android), strict biometric database mutation invalidation flags (kSecAccessControlBiometryCurrentSet and setInvalidatedByBiometricEnrollment(true)), and challenge-response asymmetric signature operations over simple storage retrieval.

## Strict Guidelines
- Engineers MUST ALWAYS enforce cryptographic signature generation or hardware-gated decryption inside native secure hardware; authentication MUST NEVER rely on boolean status checks returned by a bridge.
- Engineers MUST configure native key generation with strict biometric mutation constraints: Android Keystore MUST enable `setInvalidatedByBiometricEnrollment(true)` and iOS Keychain MUST apply `kSecAccessControlBiometryCurrentSet`.
- Code SHOULD intercept `KeyPermanentlyInvalidatedException` (Android) and `errSecAuthFailed` / `errSecItemNotFound` (iOS) at the Capacitor bridge boundary to distinguish between user cancellation and biometric database tampering.
- Services MUST execute a server-side hardware attestation exchange (App Attest for iOS, Play Integrity / Hardware Key Attestation for Android) upon key invalidation before re-enrolling a newly provisioned key pair.
- Components NEVER store master session tokens, refresh tokens, or sensitive symmetric keys in unencrypted web storage (`localStorage`, `CapacitorPreferences`, or IndexedDB).

## Bad vs Good Implementations
### Hardware-Backed Key Decryption vs. Naive Boolean Biometric Gate

#### Bad Antipattern (AI Common Hallucination)
> **Why it fails**: The native biometric check returns a boolean result detached from the storage mechanism. A compromised or modified biometric enrollment (e.g. an attacker enrolling a finger on an unlocked device) completely bypasses protection because the underlying token stored in Preferences is not bound to a hardware key.
```typescript
import { NativeBiometric } from 'capacitor-native-biometric';
import { Preferences } from '@capacitor/preferences';

export async function authenticateAndUnlockSession(): Promise<string | null> {
  // Flaw: Decoupled boolean prompt. If a secondary user adds a fingerprint in OS settings,
  // this returns success and reveals the stored token without cryptographic invalidation.
  const verified = await NativeBiometric.verifyIdentity({
    reason: 'Authenticate to access secure vault',
    title: 'Biometric Login',
  }).then(() => true).catch(() => false);

  if (verified) {
    const { value } = await Preferences.get({ key: 'auth_token' });
    return value;
  }
  return null;
}
```

#### Production Standard (Correct)
> **Standard**: Binds authentication directly to a cryptographic operation executed in native secure hardware. If biometric records are modified in the OS, native Keystore/Secure Enclave hardware automatically invalidates the key, returning a specific hardware failure caught by the Capacitor boundary to enforce immediate session termination and re-attestation.
```typescript
import { registerPlugin } from '@capacitor/core';

interface HardwareKeyPlugin {
  signPayload(options: { challenge: string; keyAlias: string }): Promise<{ signature: string }>;
  reEnrollKey(options: { keyAlias: string }): Promise<{ attestationCertificateChain: string[] }>;
}

const SecureHardwareBridge = registerPlugin<HardwareKeyPlugin>('SecureHardwareBridge');

export enum BiometricSecurityError {
  BIOMETRICS_MUTATED = 'BIOMETRICS_MUTATED',
  AUTHENTICATION_FAILED = 'AUTHENTICATION_FAILED',
}

export async function signAuthenticationChallenge(
  challenge: string,
  keyAlias: string
): Promise<string> {
  try {
    // Native layer executes crypto operation directly against iOS Secure Enclave (kSecAccessControlBiometryCurrentSet)
    // or Android Keystore with setInvalidatedByBiometricEnrollment(true).
    const { signature } = await SecureHardwareBridge.signPayload({
      challenge,
      keyAlias,
    });
    return signature;
  } catch (error: any) {
    // Distinct native OS exception mappings
    if (error.code === 'ERR_KEY_PERMANENTLY_INVALIDATED' || error.code === 'errSecAuthFailed') {
      // Mandatory invariant: Purge local identity and trigger server-attested re-enrollment
      await handleBiometricMutationEvent(keyAlias);
      throw new Error(BiometricSecurityError.BIOMETRICS_MUTATED);
    }
    throw new Error(BiometricSecurityError.AUTHENTICATION_FAILED);
  }
}

async function handleBiometricMutationEvent(keyAlias: string): Promise<void> {
  // Invalidate any local transient state
  sessionStorage.clear();
  // Remote attestation and re-enrollment workflow required
  console.warn(`Biometric set mutated for alias ${keyAlias}. Key permanently invalidated.`);
}
```

Architectural Specification & Invariant Rationale

Architectural Invariant Design: Capacitor 7 Hardware-Backed Key Attestation & Biometric Invalidation Standard

Capacitor 7 Hardware-Backed Key Attestation & Biometric Invalidation Standard defines an industrial-grade behavioral standard for mobile engineering. Enforces hardware-backed cryptographic keys bound directly to the native OS biometric database state within Capacitor 7 architectures. Guarantees immediate cryptographic invalidation, local secret erasure, and remote key re-attestation when OS biometric database mutations (e.g., new fingerprint or face enrollment) are detected. Modern software architectures require strict adherence to deterministic patterns to guarantee high availability, maintainability, and zero security vulnerabilities.

Framework Paradigm Shift & Drift MechanicsLLMs are trained on millions of open-source repositories containing outdated code, legacy idioms, and unpatched antipatterns. When coding assistants generate implementations for this stack, they default to common statistical tokens: Treating Biometric Authentication as an Unbound Local Boolean Gate Vulnerable to Biometric Database Mutation Without an explicit system instruction file, developers spend hours debugging silent failures.
Failure Modes & Production Blast Radius

Hazard Analysis: What Breaks Without This Rule

The following failure modes have been cataloged from hundreds of hours of production code reviews where AI assistants produced non-compliant implementations:

Failure ModeAI Symptom (The Anti-Pattern)SeverityProduction Impact & Remedy
AI Hallucination & Deprecation DriftTreating Biometric Authentication as an Unbound Local Boolean Gate Vulnerable to Biometric Database MutationCritical
Violating this industrial standard introduces regression bugs, security risks, and unexpected runtime failures in production.
Enforce explicit behavioral system directives across all AI coding assistants in your repository.
Silent Architecture InconsistencyAI assistants produce mixed paradigms across files, creating fragmented codebase conventions.Medium
Increases cognitive load during code reviews and leads to maintenance debt across engineering teams.
Pin project conventions in .cursor/rules, CLAUDE.md, and AGENTS.md so all team agents follow identical guardrails.
Architectural Directives in Detail

Step-by-Step Production Directives

Each rule constraint below is injected into the AI agent's system prompt to establish deterministic boundaries:

1

Engineers MUST ALWAYS enforce cryptographic signature generation or hardware-gated decryption inside native secure hardware

Engineers MUST ALWAYS enforce cryptographic signature generation or hardware-gated decryption inside native secure hardware; authentication MUST NEVER rely on boolean status checks returned by a bridge.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
2

Engineers MUST configure native key generation with strict biometric mutation constraints

Engineers MUST configure native key generation with strict biometric mutation constraints: Android Keystore MUST enable `setInvalidatedByBiometricEnrollment(true)` and iOS Keychain MUST apply `kSecAccessControlBiometryCurrentSet`.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
3

Code SHOULD intercept `KeyPermanentlyInvalidatedException` (Android) and `errSecAuthFailed` / `errSecItemNotFound` (iOS) at the Capacitor bridge boundary to distinguish between user cancellation and biometric database tampering.

Code SHOULD intercept `KeyPermanentlyInvalidatedException` (Android) and `errSecAuthFailed` / `errSecItemNotFound` (iOS) at the Capacitor bridge boundary to distinguish between user cancellation and biometric database tampering.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
4

Services MUST execute a server-side hardware attestation exchange (App Attest for iOS, Play Integrity / Hardware Key Attestation for Android) upon key invalidation before re-enrolling a newly provisioned key pair.

Services MUST execute a server-side hardware attestation exchange (App Attest for iOS, Play Integrity / Hardware Key Attestation for Android) upon key invalidation before re-enrolling a newly provisioned key pair.

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
5

Components NEVER store master session tokens, refresh tokens, or sensitive symmetric keys in unencrypted web storage (`localStorage`, `CapacitorPreferences`, or IndexedDB).

Components NEVER store master session tokens, refresh tokens, or sensitive symmetric keys in unencrypted web storage (`localStorage`, `CapacitorPreferences`, or IndexedDB).

Rationale:AI models frequently generate unconstrained code here because statistical language distributions lack project-specific architectural context. Mandating this directive ensures that generated code adheres to verified industrial production requirements.
Enforcement:Integrated into the Agent Pack rule file. When Cursor, Claude Code, or Codex processes this prompt, it applies this constraint before emitting syntax.
Technical Questions & Answers

Frequently Asked Technical Questions

Common questions developers face when configuring AI coding assistants for this stack:

Q:Why is Capacitor 7 Hardware-Backed Key Attestation & Biometric Invalidation Standard critical for AI coding assistants?

Enforces hardware-backed cryptographic keys bound directly to the native OS biometric database state within Capacitor 7 architectures. Guarantees immediate cryptographic invalidation, local secret erasure, and remote key re-attestation when OS biometric database mutations (e.g., new fingerprint or face enrollment) are detected. Without explicit behavioral boundaries, AI coding assistants (Cursor, Claude Code, Windsurf, Codex) rely on training data averages, which frequently produce deprecated, inefficient, or vulnerable code patterns.

Q:How does adopting this rule prevent AI hallucinations?

This rule explicitly declares what the AI must avoid (Treating Biometric Authentication as an Unbound Local Boolean Gate Vulnerable to Biometric Database Mutation) and prescribes verified positive examples. Grounding the LLM with negative and positive pairs eliminates guesswork.

Q:Which AI coding environments are supported?

This specification is multi-platform compatible: Cursor (.cursor/rules/*.mdc & .cursorrules), Anthropic Claude Code (CLAUDE.md), Windsurf (.windsurfrules), Codex / Cline (AGENTS.md), and GitHub Copilot (.github/copilot-instructions.md).

Q:Can I combine this rule with other technology stacks?

Yes. Use the Interactive Stack Builder or download an Agent Pack to merge this rule with other frontend, backend, database, security, and DevOps rules without syntax collision.

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